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HOW TO APPLY MOLINISM TO THE  
THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF MORAL LUCK
Robert J. Hartman
The problem of moral luck is that a general fact about luck and an intuitive 
moral principle jointly imply the following skeptical conclusion: human be-
ings are morally responsible for at most a tiny fraction of each action. This 
skeptical conclusion threatens to undermine the claim that human beings 
deserve their respective eternal reward and punishment. But even if this re-
striction on moral responsibility is compatible with the doctrine of the final 
judgment, the quality of one’s afterlife within heaven or hell still appears to 
be lucky. Utilizing recent responses to the problem of moral luck, I explore 
several Molinist accounts of the final judgment that resolve both theological 
problems of moral luck. Some of these accounts entirely eliminate moral luck 
while others ensure that the moral luck involved in the judgment is overall 
good luck.
According to the Christian religion, God judges each human being after 
his or her death. Some receive rewards and others are punished; each 
one is treated no worse than what he or she deserves. However, Thomas 
Nagel argues that a general fact about luck and a plausible moral principle 
jointly imply the skeptical conclusion that human beings are praiseworthy 
or blameworthy for at most a tiny fraction of each action.1 If human be-
ings are praiseworthy or blameworthy for at most a small fragment of 
each action, how can each person deserve the reward or punishment that 
Christian revelation ascribes to him or her? Additionally, even if each 
person does merit his or her reward or punishment, this restriction on 
moral responsibility does not eliminate all luck from the final judgment. 
The quality of one’s eternal flourishing or suffering is still subject to luck.
The aim of this essay is to explore several accounts of the final judgment 
able to resolve both theological problems of moral luck. Each account of 
the judgment assumes a particular account of moral responsibility and 
utilizes divine middle knowledge. The first and second accounts adopt 
a luck-free view of moral responsibility and apply Molinism to develop 
a moral luck-free version of the judgment. The third account allows our 
lives to be saturated with moral luck but employs middle knowledge 
1Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck,” in Mortal Questions, ed. Thomas Nagel (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979), 24–38.
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to ensure that all moral luck is overall good luck. Given the moral and 
Molinist assumptions in each account, all three views are logically pos-
sible. Nevertheless, each is liable to serious objections. After taking stock 
of these objections in the final section of the essay, I point in the direc-
tion of two additional accounts that avoid many or all of them. The final 
two accounts eliminate a substantial amount of moral luck and employ 
Molinism to guarantee that all remaining moral luck is overall good luck.
These Molinist applications may also be relevant to the debate between 
general theories of divine providence. Thomas Flint suggests that perhaps 
“the greatest hope for progress” in adjudicating between general theories 
of divine providence is to consider each of their ramifications for spe-
cific Christian doctrines.2 According to this criterion, the general view of 
providence with the most compelling account of difficult Christian doc-
trines has an edge over the others. The Molinist research program has 
already covered a lot of ground. Philosophers have, for example, applied 
Molinism to the problem of evil, original sin, biblical inspiration, papal 
infallibility, prophecy, unanswered prayers, and the incarnation.3 I extend 
this research program by putting Molinism to work on the final judg-
ment.4 If one of these Molinist accounts of the final judgment is not only 
possible but plausible, it may provide additional motivation for accepting 
Molinism over competing theories of providence with no comparable 
application.
The Problem of Moral Luck
Moral luck occurs when something outside one’s control affects that for 
which one is morally responsible. One kind of moral luck involves the 
consequences of one’s actions. The result of an action is often affected by 
factors outside of the agent’s control. Suppose, for example, that Sally is 
at a party where she gets drunk and drives home.5 On her way home, she 
swerves and merely hits a curb. However, now suppose that when Sally is 
2Thomas P. Flint, “Whence and Wither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” in 
Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 46.
3See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 
chapter 9; Michael Rea, “The Metaphysics of Original Sin,” in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. 
Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 319–356; 
William Lane Craig, ‘“Men Moved by the Holy Spirit Spoke from God’ (2 Peter 1:21): A 
Middle Knowledge Perspective on Biblical Inspiration,” Philosophia Christi 1 (1999), 45–82; 
Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1998), chapters 8–11; Thomas P. Flint ‘“A Death He Freely Accepted’: Molinist Reflections on 
the Incarnation,” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001), 3–20.
4The doctrine of the final judgment has received Molinist treatment before. See Mark B. 
Anderson, “Molinism, Open Theism, and Soteriological Luck,” Religious Studies 47 (2011), 
371–381; William Lane Craig, ‘“No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on 
the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989), 172–188; Linda 
Zagzebski, “Religious Luck,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), 407. I incorporate Zagzebski 
and Anderson’s proposals in the first version of the judgment. In the last four accounts, I 
adopt and extend Craig’s work on soteriology to the theological problem of moral luck.
5Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 29.
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driving drunk, she not only swerves and hits a curb, but she also kills a pe-
destrian who just happens to be standing on the curb. The only difference 
between these outcomes is sheer luck—whether a pedestrian happens to 
be standing there. Even though Sally’s contribution is identical in these 
scenarios, her blameworthiness differs. In the first scenario, she is not 
blameworthy for killing someone, and, in the second, she is blameworthy 
for killing someone. Her blameworthiness is subject to consequential luck.
Another kind of moral luck concerns a person’s circumstances. One’s 
actual circumstances fix a particular set of morally significant challenges, 
which influences the moral quality of what a person freely chooses to do. 
And because one’s actual circumstances are but a small subset of the pos-
sible circumstances one could have been in, luck shapes what a person 
freely does. For example, suppose John is born to a German family near the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and he is eventually faced with mor-
ally significant decisions about whether to join the Nazi regime.6 In those 
circumstances, John freely chooses to become a Nazi and performs actions 
appropriate to his role. However, if he were to have been presented with a 
job opportunity in Argentina just prior to the Nazi ascent, he would have 
freely emigrated and would have freely chosen to become an upstanding 
Argentinian citizen.7 But then, it appears that the circumstances in which 
John happens to find himself significantly contribute to the kind of actions 
he performs. His blameworthiness is subject to circumstantial luck.
A final type of moral luck concerns a person’s constitution. A person’s 
natural temperament affects the difficulty of making good moral decisions, 
and one’s natural powers (such as the ability to see or hear) significantly 
affect the kind of moral choices one faces. Suppose Lucy is naturally sym-
pathetic.8 Being naturally inclined to care for others in pain, she notices a 
suffering stranger and stops to help. However, suppose instead that Lucy 
is naturally cold-hearted or blind. In either case, she would fail to help 
the stranger, because she would not care about the stranger’s well-being 
or she would fail to perceive the stranger’s need. But then, whether Lucy 
decides to help a suffering stranger substantially depends upon which 
constitutive properties she happens to have. Her praiseworthiness is sub-
ject to constitutive luck.
The next step in the skeptical argument is to introduce an anti-luck 
moral principle that we may call the diminishing principle or DP: if an action 
(or its consequences) is significantly affected by factors outside the agent’s 
control, then those factors significantly diminish the agent’s praiseworthi-
ness or blameworthiness for that action (or its consequences).9 The idea 
6Ibid., 34.
7Occasionally, I stipulate what a person would freely do in a particular circumstance. Af-
firming true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is not required to state the problem of 
moral luck, but that affirmation does make the problem more acute.
8Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 32–33.
9Nagel states the anti-luck principle in several ways: “people cannot be morally assessed 
for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors outside of their control”; “one cannot 
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behind the DP is that moral responsibility should be protected from luck. 
However, applying the DP to each of the above examples produces a skep-
tical result. Sally’s blameworthiness is partially mitigated in the scenario 
where she kills a pedestrian, because the spatial status of the pedestrian is 
outside of her control. John, the Nazi, is only partially morally responsible 
for his actions, because his circumstances are outside of his control and 
they deeply affect the actions he chooses and forgoes. Sympathetic Lucy is 
also only partially morally responsible for her actions, because her consti-
tutive properties are outside of her control and they significantly influence 
her choices.
The above cases plausibly generalize such that all morally significant 
actions are apparently morally lucky. If we assume that the DP is true, 
as appears plausible, then moral responsibility for all human actions and 
their consequences is significantly diminished. To summarize the argu-
ment:
(1) All actions and their consequences are significantly affected by fac-
tors outside their agent’s control.
(2) If an action (or its consequences) is significantly affected by factors 
outside its agent’s control, then those factors significantly diminish 
the agent’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for that action (or 
its consequences).
Therefore,
(3) Every agent’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness is significantly 
diminished for all actions and their consequences.
How much does luck diminish the agent’s praiseworthiness or blame-
worthiness? Nagel’s answer is that “the area of genuine agency, and 
therefore of legitimate moral judgment, seems to shrink under this scru-
tiny to an extensionless point.”10 This answer also includes the mitigating 
force of a kind of luck not hitherto mentioned—causal luck. Causal luck 
occurs when one’s actions are causally determined by antecedent states 
of affairs and the laws of nature. Let us assume that human beings have 
some version of libertarian free will and are thus not subject to causal 
luck. That assumption assuages Nagel’s extremely skeptical conclusion 
but plausibly leaves the following moderately skeptical conclusion intact: 
human beings are praiseworthy or blameworthy for at most a tiny fraction 
of each action. Call this moderate skeptical conclusion the skeptical con-
clusion. Given that the above premises are true, the skeptical conclusion 
appears plausible when one considers how much luck is involved in any 
choice. Luck influences which non-determining events set the stage for the 
be more culpable or estimable for anything than one is for that fraction of it which is under 
one’s control.” My formulation more closely resembles the latter. See Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 
25, 28.
10Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 35.
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choice as well as what transpires after it. Additionally, luck influences the 
decision itself through factors internal and external to the agent.
In what follows, I explicate several accounts of the final judgment. Each 
account assumes a particular response to this skeptical argument. But 
before I state these responses and integrate them into their respective ac-
counts of the final judgment, I want to consider some implications of the 
skeptical conclusion for the Christian religion.
The Theological Problem of Moral Luck
The doctrine of the final judgment states that God judges each person 
according to his or her pre-mortem actions,11 and the verdict is that virtu-
ally12 all moral agents deserve damnation by their merit alone. However, 
the claim that human beings are blameworthy for at most a tiny frac-
tion of each action threatens to falsify the claim that each person merits 
damnation—conceived in a strong or weak sense. The strong version of hell 
describes damnation as a state where God regularly inflicts pain upon the 
damned forever.13 That view of hell is plausibly undermined, because, if 
people are morally responsible for only a small part of their earthly lives, 
it appears plausible that human beings do not merit that degree of retri-
bution.14 The weak version of hell describes divine punishment as allowing 
the wicked person to suffer the natural consequences of his or her vicious 
character forever.15 If people are morally responsible for only a small part 
of their pre-mortem lives, it seems plausible that they do not deserve to 
suffer the natural consequences of their earthly lives for eternity, because 
what they do and who they become is deeply influenced by things outside 
their control.
But suppose that the skeptical problem of moral luck is not a problem. 
That is, given that human beings are responsible for only a small fraction 
of their actions, they still merit their respective eternal reward or pun-
ishment. Even so, the DP is unable to eliminate all luck from the final 
judgment, because there is still the comparative problem of moral luck. To 
illustrate this problem, suppose that blameworthiness is quantifiable in 
11Romans 2:5–6.
12I write ‘virtually’ because all Christian traditions affirm that Jesus is impeccable. Some 
traditions also claim that Mary is sinless.
13See Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1993), 
21.9–10; Jonathan Edwards, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God (Old LandMark Publishing, 
2004). 
14The plausibility of that claim assumes that the following type of argument is unsound: 
(i) virtually all people sin against God, (ii) a single sin against an infinite being makes the of-
fender infinitely blameworthy, and thus (iii) virtually all people are infinitely blameworthy. 
For a good discussion of the plausibility of this argument, see Jonathan Kvanvig, The Problem 
of Hell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 27–55.
15See C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1940), chapter 
8; Eleonore Stump, “Dante’s Hell, Aquinas’s Moral Theory, and the Love of God,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986), 181–198; Richard Swinburne, “A Theodicy of Heaven and 
Hell,” in The Existence and Nature of God, ed. Alfred J. Freddoso (Notre Dame, IN: Notre 
Dame Press, 1983), 37–54.
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blames. Suppose further that, as a Nazi, John merits 1,000,000 blames but 
would only deserve 10,000 blames as an Argentinian citizen. If people are 
morally responsible for only a small part of each action, say 1/1000, then 
John the Nazi deserves 1,000 blames and John the Argentinian only 10. 
Even if the fraction for which he is morally responsible is different than 
1/1000 or it is a different fraction for different actions, it is still plausible 
that there is a significant disparity between the moral worth he accrues by 
acting in different circumstances. The upshot is that even after the DP is 
applied to his moral worth, there is still some luck in what John is respon-
sible for, which means that his punishment is influenced by luck.
Note that the skeptical and comparative problems are related. As the 
degree of moral responsibility for each action decreases, the less influence 
luck has upon one’s moral worth but the less plausible the claim that one is 
blameworthy enough to merit hell. As the degree of moral responsibility 
for each action increases, the more plausible it is that people merit their 
punishment but the more influence luck has upon one’s moral worth. One 
way or another, luck poses a difficulty for eternal punishment.
Linda Zagzebski suggests that one way out of these problems is to give 
up the doctrine of hell.16 The idea is to sever the moral from the soteriolog-
ical order. In that case, God does not punish people at all, and so there are 
no luck-based problems concerning punishment. The price of this solution 
is that it departs from the Christian tradition. But let us momentarily as-
sume that this departure is unproblematic in order to see that it may solve 
only part of each theological problem of moral luck.
While entrance to heaven itself is not a reward for meritorious actions, 
a prima facie reading of some biblical passages indicates that there is a 
moral order in heaven. Jesus often asserts that people will have “trea-
sure in heaven” if they sell their possessions and give to the poor.17 His 
followers receive “rewards” in heaven for persevering in faith amidst 
persecution and are “repaid” at the resurrection for blessing those who 
lack the means to repay them.18 Moreover, his disciples are to “store up . . . 
treasures in heaven” by performing good deeds.19 These Scriptures appear 
to indicate that human beings merit rewards in heaven (but not heaven 
itself) on account of their earthly deeds.
Both luck-based problems regarding blameworthiness in hell apply 
mutatis mutandis to meriting rewards in heaven. Given the skeptical con-
clusion, it seems plausible that people are not praiseworthy enough to 
merit the rewards the Bible attributes. Furthermore, even if that is not so, 
the quantity and quality of the meritorious deeds one does perform is 
still shaped by factors outside one’s control. As a result, the rewards one 
merits in heaven are subject to luck. Assuming the desert interpretation of 
16Zagzebski, “Religious Luck,” 410. She does not endorse this view.
17Matthew 19:21. All biblical quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version.
18Respectively, Luke 6:22–23, 14:13–14.
19Matthew 6:20.
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heavenly rewards is correct, the entire theological problem of moral luck 
cannot be solved by abolishing hell, because that solution does not render 
God’s distribution of heavenly rewards moral luck-free. But if someone is 
already willing to discard the doctrine of hell for a solution to the problem 
of moral luck, that person is likely also to dispense with the moral order in 
heaven. This is, however, an additional and unnoticed cost.
Another overlooked ramification of moral luck is that it undermines a 
popular solution to what we may call the soteriological problem of geo-
graphic luck. The problem involves a tension between the claim that a good 
God would provide everyone with an opportunity to receive his grace, 
and the claim that some people who are geographically isolated from the 
Christian message lack opportunity to exercise faith. Some people fail to 
have access to the cognitive claims of Christianity required for conscious 
adherence to the Christian religion. One solution to this problem removes 
some of the cognitive content from faith in order to make exercising faith 
partially within their control. Though unable to espouse explicit faith, 
those who are geographically isolated from the Christian message are able 
to exercise implicit faith. Implicit faith involves seeking God as far as his 
general revelation permits and following the light of conscience by divine 
grace. As the Catholic Catechism states,
Those who, through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel of Christ 
or his Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart, and, 
moved by grace, try in their actions to do his will as they know it through the 
dictates of their conscience—those too may achieve eternal salvation.20
But whether one follows the dictates of conscience and thus has im-
plicit faith is significantly influenced by luck. Suppose Afram’s parents are 
murdered by a neighboring tribe in an all-too-common tribal war. Left to 
his lonely circumstances, he freely becomes hard and bitter and cares little 
about the demands of conscience. He fails to have implicit faith. Suppose 
instead that Afram’s parents had not died at war but lived on to old age. 
With a family to take care of him, Afram would freely choose to become 
the kind of person who is sensitive to the dictates of conscience and would 
come to possess implicit faith. The upshot is that if moral luck exists, then 
possessing implicit faith seems to be partially a matter of luck. If having 
implicit faith is itself subject to luck, then it cannot function to remove 
the luck from God’s judgment regarding people who are geographically 
isolated from the Christian message.
Unrestricted Profile Molinism
Now that we have a better sense of how luck impacts the doctrines of hell, 
heaven, and implicit faith, let us consider one way to resolve the skeptical 
20U.S. Catholic Church, The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. (New York: Doubleday 
Religion, 2003), section 847. Italics mine. However, non-Catholic philosophers also endorse 
this idea. See Craig, “No Other Name,” 176, 186; Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 208.
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and comparative problems of moral luck. In this section, I explicate Michael 
Zimmerman’s luck-free account of moral responsibility and then present 
and critique the resulting account of the final judgment.21
Zimmerman’s response to the problem of moral luck is to reject the DP 
for a more general anti-luck principle.22 Call this more general principle 
that “luck is irrelevant to moral responsibility” the irrelevance principle or 
IP.23 The distinctive merit of the IP is that it may entirely eliminate moral 
luck while avoiding the skeptical conclusion. In what follows, I will apply 
the IP to each kind of luck in order to show how it avoids the skeptical 
conclusion; the antiskeptical gain concerns the kinds of luck that most 
intimately influence what action one performs—circumstantial and con-
stitutive luck.
Zimmerman joins Nagel in thinking that human beings are not mor-
ally responsible for the consequences of their actions when they are subject 
to luck.24 The drunk driver in each scenario possesses the same degree 
of blameworthiness. The unlucky driver is not additionally blameworthy 
for killing the pedestrian who happens to be standing at the curb.25 But 
agreeing that a person is not morally responsible for the consequences of 
his or her choice still allows him or her to make a choice. That is not so 
for circumstantial luck. A small change in an assassin’s circumstance may 
negate his opportunity to decide whether to carry out a hit.26 For example, 
a large truck may suddenly park directly in his line of fire and obstruct his 
only shot. Or his alarm clock battery may die and he might sleep through 
his opportunity to shoot the target. Or his girlfriend may regularly call 
immediately before a lazy mob boss, which prevents him from being hired 
in the first place.
How is circumstantial luck supposed to be irrelevant to moral responsi-
bility? Zimmerman suggests that it is irrelevant to one’s praiseworthiness or 
blameworthiness which of one’s possible circumstances are actual, because 
people are morally responsible for what they would do in actual and non-
actual circumstances.27 Supposing that the frequent calls from the assassin’s 
girlfriend result in his failure to be hired, he never forms the intention to kill 
the mark. Nevertheless, the assassin is still blameworthy for the assassina-
tion attempt in virtue of the following true counterfactual: had the mob boss 
hired him and nothing obstructed his ability to take the shot, the assassin 
would have formed the relevant intention and taken the shot. Thus, the 
21Michael J. Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” The Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002), 
553–576.
22For his argument against the DP, see his “Luck and Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 97 
(1987), 376–379.
23Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” 559. 
24Ibid., 562.
25As Zimmerman notes, there may be non-desert related reasons for treating the drivers 
asymmetrically. See his “Taking Luck Seriously,” 562.
26Ibid., 559.
27Ibid., 564.
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assassin is blameworthy even if he is not blameworthy for anything in the 
actual world.
Zimmerman handles constitutive luck in the same way.28 It is irrelevant 
to one’s overall praiseworthiness and blameworthiness which contingent 
constitutive properties one has in the actual world, because one is morally 
responsible for the actions one would perform or omit with actual and non-
actual contingent constitutive properties. But not all of one’s constitutive 
properties may be contingent. If one’s temperament or physical capacities 
are among one’s essential properties, some constitutive luck may not be 
eliminable. Essential traits are outside of one’s control but influence that 
for which one is morally responsible. The result is that Zimmerman’s ac-
count of moral responsibility may not be entirely luck-free.29
To summarize, the IP implies that the luck that affects one’s actions is 
not moral luck—it does not affect a person’s praiseworthiness or blame-
worthiness. A person is not morally responsible for the consequences of 
his or her actions that are subject to luck, and one is morally responsible 
for what one actually does as well as what he or she would do in non-actual 
circumstances and with non-actual contingent constitutive properties. As-
sume that Zimmerman’s account is correct and combine it with Molinism. 
In that case, people are praiseworthy and blameworthy for their counter-
factual actions in virtue of their morally significant true counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom (CCFs). CCFs are propositions of the following form: 
if free agent S is in complete circumstance c, then S would freely (in a liber-
tarian sense) choose x. Let us call the set of all true and morally significant 
CCFs about a person that person’s counterfactual moral profile.
This Molinist version of Zimmerman’s view of moral responsibility 
yields an account of the final judgment that is essentially identical with 
Zagzebski’s middle knowledge proposal: God judges each human being 
for his or her entire counterfactual moral profile—for what each person 
actually does and for what he or she would do in non-actual circumstances 
and with non-actual constitutive properties.30 Call this view Unrestricted 
Profile Molinism. Unrestricted Profile Molinism solves both theological 
problems regarding heaven and hell. Given the IP, the skeptical conclusion 
is false, because, instead of diminishing what people are responsible for in 
the actual world, luck implies that people are also morally responsible for 
what they would do in non-actual circumstances and with non-actual con-
stitutive properties. Furthermore, since people are responsible for their 
28Ibid., 574–575.
29Nicholas Rescher argues that it is incoherent to assert that one has control over his or 
her constitutive properties, which implies that the scope of anti-luck principles is limited 
to circumstantial and consequential luck. See his “Moral Luck,” in Moral Luck, ed. Daniel 
Statman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 155–157. This proposal seems 
plausible at least regarding essential constitutive properties, because the problem of moral 
luck is a problem regarding a certain kind of contingency—not necessity. If this is right, 
Zimmerman’s account of moral responsibility is wholly moral luck-free.
30Zagzebski, “Religious Luck,” 407. I should note that she does not endorse this proposal.
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entire counterfactual moral profiles, they are not judged for a small lucky 
subset of what they would do. The comparative problem of moral luck is 
thus eliminated.
Additionally, as Mark Anderson argues, this counterfactual account of 
moral responsibility easily eliminates the problem of soteriological luck.31 
Suppose that Afram freely fails to have implicit faith in the actual world 
and that his epistemic and familial circumstances inclined him toward 
those decisions. Nevertheless, Afram might espouse implicit faith or even 
explicit faith in some other feasible world.32 Since he is morally respon-
sible for what he would do in non-actual circumstances, God may grant 
Afram eternal beatitude for his response to salvific grace in some other 
feasible world.33
But is it theologically plausible that God judges each person for his or 
her counterfactual moral profile? There are several reasons to think that 
one’s counterfactual moral profile is not the right object of divine evalu-
ation. One type of problem is that it trivializes the actual world in two 
ways. First, the majority of entries in one’s counterfactual moral profile 
are not about the actual world.34 As a result, one’s life in the actual world 
plays only a negligible role in God’s judgment of actual persons. Second, 
the counterfactual account of moral responsibility makes creation of a pre-
mortem existence superfluous to God’s moral assessment.35 Since people 
are morally responsible for what they would do in actual and non-actual 
circumstances, there is no reason why human beings must enjoy pre-
mortem lives at all. God may actualize human beings at the final judgment 
and send them to their eternal destinations.
Others may want to reject Unrestricted Profile Molinism because it is in-
compatible with the character account of divine reward and punishment. 
According to the weak version of hell, eternal punishment is living as the 
vicious person one has chosen to become. However, in different feasible 
worlds, it is plausible that a person develops different and incompatible 
character traits. But then punishing a person for his or her counterfactual 
moral profile turns out to be incoherent; the punishment implies that it is 
possible for a single person to have incompatible character traits.
A final difficulty is that Unrestricted Profile Molinism is plausibly 
incompatible with biblical testimony. In Scripture, actual deeds (overt 
and mental) are exclusively the object of divine evaluation. Consider an 
31Anderson, “Molinism, Open Theism, and Soteriological Luck,” 378.
32By ‘feasible’ world, I mean a possible world that God is able to weakly actualize given all 
the contingently true CCFs. For a good discussion of feasibility, see Flint’s Divine Providence, 
46–54.
33As Anderson notes, this view may imply universalism. It depends on whether there are 
actual persons who would not accept God’s invitation to salvation in any feasible world. See 
his “Molinism, Open Theism, and Soteriological Luck,” 378–379.
34Anderson, “Molinism, Open Theism, and Soteriological Luck,” 379.
35Zagzebski, “Religious Luck,” 407–408; David P. Hunt, “Middle Knowledge and the 
Soteriological Problem of Evil,” Religious Studies 27 (1991), 18–24.
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example: “All of us must appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so 
that each may receive recompense for what has been done in the body, 
whether good or evil.”36 The fact that the Scriptures refer exclusively to ac-
tual deeds as the object of divine judgment inductively contributes to the 
plausibility of the claim that God judges people only for actual deeds. If 
such Scriptures do make it plausible that God’s final judgment ranges over 
only actual deeds, then Zimmerman’s account of moral responsibility is 
plausibly incompatible with the Christian doctrine of the final judgment.
Restricted Profile Molinism
There may be a way to integrate Zimmerman’s counterfactual view of 
moral responsibility with an account of the final judgment that avoids 
these theological difficulties. In this section, I explore such a version of the 
judgment.
It is agreed by most if not all Christian theologians that gaining sal-
vation requires God’s grace. Since whether God bestows salvific grace 
is outside human control, gaining salvation is subject to luck. However, 
grace-based luck is different from moral luck. Moral luck is luck regarding 
what one deserves—one’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Divine 
grace is “religious luck;” it is luck regarding what one receives (not what 
one deserves) at the final judgment.37 Recipients of grace are treated better 
than they deserve. That God treats people differently than they merit is 
problematic only when God rewards them less or punishes them more 
than they deserve.38
Here is a coherent way to employ religious luck in restricting the 
counterfactual acts for which God judges people: people are morally re-
sponsible for the actions described in their counterfactual moral profiles, 
but God graciously judges each human being for a proper subset of his 
or her counterfactual moral profile—all and only those actions described 
by the morally significant CCFs with antecedents that obtain in the actual 
world. Call that proper subset of CCFs an actual moral profile. God judges 
people for their actual moral profiles where their actual moral profiles are 
better than their counterfactual moral profiles. As a result, God rewards 
them more and punishes them less than they merit. His judgment, then, is 
an expression of grace or religious luck, because people are treated better 
than they deserve. The world is saturated with religious not moral luck.
What is it for one to have an actual moral profile that is better than his 
or her counterfactual moral profile? One might think that an actual moral 
362 Corinthians 5:10.
37Zagzebski, “Religious Luck,” 403.
38As Zagzebski notes, this is Jesus’s lesson in the parable of the laborers in the vineyard 
(Matthew 20:1–16). See her “Religious Luck,” 406. This parable supports the idea that God 
does nothing wrong by equally rewarding unequal merit; it is not a moral fault to be gen-
erous. As Daniel Berntson suggested to me, this may not imply that there is nothing wrong 
with unequally rewarding equal merit. If he is right, then it is plausible that God rewards 
those with equal merit in similar fashion.
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profile is better than a counterfactual moral profile if the moral worth of a 
person’s actual moral profile is quantifiably higher than the average moral 
worth of his or her counterfactual moral profile. However, this suggestion 
is plausible only if (i) moral worth is quantifiable and (ii) it is possible to 
average the moral worth of one’s counterfactual moral profile. If either of 
those conditions fail, then perhaps a second proposal, which makes use 
of an aesthetic analogy, is more adequate. Just as a person with the right 
sensibilities can pick out an average or typical painting from a particular 
painter, so God can see which feasible world best exemplifies a person’s 
typical moral worth. Whether a person’s average moral worth is discov-
ered by mathematical calculation or something analogous to aesthetic 
insight, one’s actual moral profile is better than one’s counterfactual moral 
profile just in case one has a better moral worth in the actual world than 
one averages39 in the feasible worlds where one exists.40
Molinism grants God the resources to securely actualize a world in 
which each person’s actual moral profile is better than his or her aver-
aged counterfactual moral profile. Molinism ascribes middle knowledge 
to God, knowledge of what any free creature would do in any feasible 
circumstance. With that knowledge, he can place people in circumstances 
where they are sure to make free choices that closely align with his 
purposes. God places the ‘saints’, those who accept God’s offer of salva-
tion, in actual circumstances where they freely choose to become more 
praiseworthy than is typical for them across feasible worlds. They merit 
more rewards in virtue of their actual moral profiles than they average by 
their counterfactual moral profiles. The fact that each redeemed person is 
rewarded in accordance with his or her actual moral profile is not objec-
tionable, because each is given more than he or she deserves. The damned 
are also subject to religious luck.41 God places damned persons in actual 
circumstances where they freely choose to become less blameworthy than 
is typical for them across feasible worlds. The result is that God either 
inflicts less pain on the damned (on the strong version) or allows them to 
suffer softer natural consequences (on the weak version).42
This Molinist account does not require religious luck—organizing the 
actual world so that all people have more rewards or less punishments 
than they average across feasible worlds. God may place people in cir-
cumstances where they freely acquire a moral worth in the actual world 
39From now on, I alternate between ‘average’ and ‘typical’; the reader is invited to make 
the relevant modifications according to his or her preferred account.
40I thank Joel Archer and Mike Mazza for helping clarify this paragraph.
41Aquinas agrees. “Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though 
it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.” 
See his Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Ben-
ziger Bros, 1948): Ia q.21 a.4 ad.1.
42This claim presupposes that there are degrees of punishment in hell. Augustine holds 
this view in The City of God, 21.16, and it is frequently attributed to Jesus based on Luke 
12:47–48 and Matthew 11:21–24.
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that is identical to their average counterfactual moral worth. That way, 
God respectively rewards and punishes the deeds of the saints and the 
damned exactly in accordance with what they deserve by their average 
counterfactual moral profiles. However, depending on which CCFs are 
true, it may not be possible for God to actualize a highly populated world 
where all people have an identical moral worth in their actual and aver-
aged counterfactual moral profiles. Adding religious luck furnishes God 
with more creative flexibility, because he need only find a feasible world 
where the moral worth of each person’s actual moral profile is somewhere 
on a spectrum from slightly higher to vastly higher than his or her average 
moral worth. Including religious luck in my Molinist account increases its 
plausibility.
Thus far, we have considered the way moral luck influences a per-
son’s placement in a particular level within heaven or hell. Let us now 
consider the case of how moral luck influences whether a person goes to 
heaven or hell more generally. Suppose that some soteriological responses 
in the actual world are subject to circumstantial luck. That is, suppose 
some people in the actual world who either accept or reject God’s offer 
of salvation would have chosen differently had they been put in different 
circumstances. That supposition is prima facie plausible, because some 
circumstances are better than others for inclining a person to accept God’s 
grace and some people would freely choose to make qualitatively different 
eschatological decisions in different circumstances.
A person’s response to God’s offer of salvation significantly affects his 
or her moral profile. The blameworthiness of those who accept God’s in-
vitation to salvation is rendered null, and those who reject God’s offer of 
salvation retain their blameworthiness. But then, it follows that whether 
some people are blameworthy at the final judgment—whether a par-
ticular person is rewarded (and not punished) in heaven or is punished 
(and not rewarded) in hell—is subject to luck. Therefore, if some soterio-
logical responses in the actual world are subject to circumstantial luck, 
then whether some people are blameworthy at the final judgment is also 
subject to luck.
The way to show that it is not the case that whether some people are 
blameworthy at the judgment is lucky is to provide a luck-free account of so-
teriology. The luck-free soteriology that fits best with my Molinist account 
is William Lane Craig’s Molinist response to the soteriological problem of 
evil.43 The issue he is addressing is the alleged incompatibility between 
God’s existence, goodness, and omnipotence with the fact that some 
people are eternally damned. Craig’s central insight is that, by his middle 
knowledge, God can arrange circumstances such that all actual persons 
who would freely accept his invitation to salvation in some feasible world 
find themselves in actual circumstances where they do freely accept God’s 
grace. However, some people would freely reject God’s gift of salvation 
43Craig, “No Other Name,” 179–186.
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in any feasible world; some people have the property of “transworld 
damnation.”44 Since only the transworldly damned reject God’s offer of 
salvation in the actual world, their soteriological choices in the actual 
world are not subject to circumstantial luck, because they would not ac-
cept God’s saving grace in any other feasible world. Put another way, each 
person’s actual soteriological profile is no worse than his or her counterfactual 
soteriological profile. For some person to have an actual soteriological pro-
file that is no worse than his or her counterfactual soteriological profile is 
for that person to respond positively to God’s grace in the actual world if 
he or she responds positively to God’s grace in any feasible world.
The reason why Craig’s luck-free soteriology fits so nicely with my pro-
posal is that my account is an extension of Craig’s work. Craig’s account 
explains how one’s final destination—heaven or hell—is luck-free. My 
account extends his work to morality.45 It shows how the degree of one’s 
reward or punishment within heaven or hell is not morally lucky. That is, it 
explains why one’s placement within heaven or hell is not shaped by moral 
but religious luck—or no luck at all if religious luck is omitted.
Call the combination of these Molinist applications Restricted Profile 
Molinism. Restricted Profile Molinism is the view that God actualizes 
a feasible world where every person in that world has an actual moral 
profile better than his or her counterfactual moral profile and an actual so-
teriological profile no worse than his or her counterfactual soteriological 
profile. All actual persons have a better moral worth in the actual world 
than is typical for them across feasible worlds, and all actual persons who 
would accept God’s grace in some feasible world also accept God’s in-
vitation to salvation in the actual world. Although each person’s actual 
moral and soteriological profile is subject to luck, it is the benign kind 
of religious luck. Furthermore, there is a reason to think that God would 
arrange the world in the way the Restricted Profile Molinist describes. It is 
44According to Craig, actualizing a large number of damned persons might be necessary 
to actualize a world with a significant number of redeemed persons. The actual world may 
include an “optimal balance” of saved and damned persons. See his “No Other Name,” 
184–185. However, this consequentialist reasoning makes the damned a mere means for get-
ting the right number of elect persons, which violates Kant’s humanity formulation of the 
categorical imperative. One way to preserve Craig’s claim about necessity without violating 
the categorical imperative is to adopt a particular account of hell. On this view, God shows 
the damned kindness in bringing them into existence, because, even for damned souls, it is 
better for them to exist than never to have existed. As a result, damned persons are not used 
as a mere means for populating heaven.
Additionally, David Hunt suggests that Craig’s claim about the necessity of actualizing 
damned souls lacks imagination. Since the relational role that damned persons play in the 
“optimal balance” can be played by mindless simulacra controlled by God’s power and 
middle knowledge, no actual persons need to suffer damnation in order to sufficiently popu-
late heaven. See Hunt’s “Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil,” 22–24. 
Craig retorts that Hunt’s suggestion is so “morally abhorrent and unworthy of God that He 
could not entertain it.” Imagine being married to an automaton or giving birth to one! I find 
Craig’s Cartesian response that God is not a deceiver to be plausible. See Craig’s “Middle 
Knowledge and Christian Exclusivism,” Sophia 34 (1995), 133–134. 
45Craig would not welcome this particular extension; he explicitly rejects a counterfactual 
account of moral responsibility in “Middle Knowledge and Christian Exclusivism,” 131–132.
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good that actual moral profiles are not shaped by moral luck if God judges 
human beings in the way that the Scriptures indicate.
Restricted Profile Molinism also appears to avoid the theological prob-
lems of Unrestricted Profile Molinism. First, one’s actual life is not trivial 
to the final judgment, because one’s actions in the actual world are exclu-
sively the object of God’s assessment. Furthermore, actual human beings 
live their pre-mortem lives prior to the judgment; they are not actualized 
immediately before the judgment itself. Second, the punishments of the 
damned and the rewards of the saints cannot result in a person possibly 
possessing incompatible character traits, because each person’s life in a 
single possible world provides the natural consequences for reward or 
punishment. Third, it is consistent with the plausible reading of Scripture 
that God’s judgment of moral agents is restricted to the actual world.
Restricted Profile Molinism requires one qualification. It does not apply 
to non-moral agents—human beings who die having never become moral 
agents in the actual world.46 Non-moral agents have no actual moral pro-
file at all,47 because they perform no morally appraisable actions. Thus, 
such human beings cannot have actual moral profiles better than their 
average counterfactual moral profiles. The upshot is that the explanatory 
scope of Restricted Profile Molinism is restricted to moral agents; God 
actualizes a feasible world where every moral agent in that world has an 
actual moral profile better than his or her counterfactual moral profile and 
an actual soteriological profile no worse than his or her counterfactual 
soteriological profile.
What happens to non-moral agents is a thorny issue for any account of 
the final judgment. While there may be other explanations that shore up 
this gap, I point toward a possible way to extend the luck-free scope of 
Restricted Profile Molinism to include non-moral agents (as well as those 
in the process of becoming moral agents): God judges non-moral agents 
for their deeds and soteriological responses in some non-actual feasible 
world where their moral profiles are better than average and their soterio-
logical responses are no worse than they are in any other feasible world. 
Interestingly, this extension avoids many of the objections to Unrestricted 
Profile Molinism. First, the triviality objection has no bite, because the 
actual world is already trivial for the moral lives of non-moral agents. 
Second, this extension does not result in the problem of possibly acquiring 
incompatible character traits, because a person is judged for what he or 
she does in a single possible world. Third, this extension requires that the 
plausible reading of Scripture (that God judges people for their deeds in 
the actual world) is restricted to moral agents, which does not appear that 
implausible.
46I thank Josh Johnson and James Sterba for pointing this out.
47This claim presupposes that human beings do not inherit the blameworthiness of the 
original parent’s fall from grace. For a discussion of pre-Augustinian authorities who hold 
this view, see Richard Swinburne’s Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), 144–147.
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Nevertheless, one theological objection remains. Even if it is compatible 
with the Restricted Profile Molinist commitment that human beings enjoy 
pre-mortem existence before God judges them for the restricted set of 
their CCFs, it is not true that people must enjoy that kind of life before the 
judgment. This is the case for two reasons. First, people are fundamentally 
morally responsible for what they would do in any feasible circumstance. 
Second, CCFs are true independently of any particular possible world 
being actual. Since being praiseworthy or blameworthy does not require 
a pre-mortem life, it is possible for God to create and immediately judge 
human beings. But then, it is possible for God to bypass all pre-mortem 
and post-mortem evils.48 God is able to judge human beings without their 
having to experience earthly evil, and he can create and judge only those 
human beings with a positive response to his offer of salvation in the set 
of true CCFs for which he holds them accountable. So, while Restricted 
Profile Molinism fits the data of Scripture and undermines both problems 
of moral luck, there are serious questions about why God would be mo-
tivated to actualize the kind of world specified by the view, because he is 
able to actualize much better worlds—worlds without pre-mortem and 
post-mortem suffering.
Morally Lucky Molinism
There is yet another version of the final judgment that avoids both theo-
logical problems of moral luck and is not subject to the motivation problem 
afflicting both versions of Profile Molinism. This version of the judgment 
escapes the skeptical argument from moral luck in a way that is antithet-
ical to Zimmerman’s approach: it denies categorical anti-luck principles 
like the DP and IP altogether.49 The result is that one’s actions and their 
consequences as well as one’s overall moral worth are significantly shaped 
by moral luck.50 Of course, this does not imply that control is irrelevant to 
responsibility. Assuming that this new response to the problem of moral 
luck is correct, the skeptical problem of moral luck vanishes. Because luck 
does not categorically diminish moral responsibility, it is not the case that 
people are morally responsible for a mere fraction of their actions and 
their consequences.
But the comparative problem of moral luck is more stubborn. Even if 
people are morally responsible for their actions and consequences, there 
is still something unsettling about the fact one might have performed 
more noble acts and fewer selfish acts had one’s circumstances or consti-
tutive properties been different. It is unsettling because it seems unfair 
that one’s luck might be bad luck and thus that one might incur retributive 
48Hunt, “Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil,” 18–19.
49Margret Urban Walker holds this view in her “Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure 
Agency,” Metaphilosophy 22 (1991), 14–27. See also Michael Otsuka’s “Moral Luck: Optional, 
Not Brute,” Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009), 373–388.
50By assumption, one’s moral worth is not shaped by causal luck.
84 Faith and Philosophy
punishment from other humans or from God, which might have been 
avoided but for better luck.
The possibility that one’s moral luck is overall bad luck can be eluded 
by recasting the basic structure of Restricted Profile Molinism with our 
new assumption. The idea behind Morally Lucky Molinism is that God can 
providentially ensure that each moral agent’s moral worth is shaped by 
overall good moral luck by managing the constitutive properties each 
person has, the circumstances each person is in, and the consequences 
that follow each person’s actions. Overall good moral luck involves having a 
better moral worth (being more praiseworthy and/or less blameworthy) in 
the actual world than is typical across feasible worlds. In addition to each 
agent having overall good moral luck, God can guarantee that all moral 
agents accept God’s salvific grace in the actual world if they accept it in 
any feasible worlds. But then, the unsettling prospect of allowing moral 
luck in the final judgment is abolished, because the moral luck involved in 
each person’s moral worth is overall good luck.
There are at least four possible ways to extend Morally Lucky Molinism 
to non-moral agents.51 Each possibility assumes that all non-moral agents 
in the actual world are transworldly damned—they would not freely ac-
cept God’s invitation to salvation in any feasible world. Some of these 
possibilities are unorthodox and some require additional assumptions. 
First, all non-moral agents are sent to heaven at death. It is overall good 
moral luck for those human beings to die without an actual moral record, 
because they are not punished in hell as they would have been had God 
actualized any one of the feasible worlds where they are moral agents.52 
Second, all non-moral agents are cosigned to limbo at death. Whatever 
the nature of limbo, it is a better fate than damnation, and so it is good 
moral luck that non-moral agents die as such. Third, all non-moral agents 
are damned at death. This possibility requires the following assumption 
about original sin: each actual human being inherits the blameworthiness 
of the original parent.53 It is good moral luck for such human beings to 
die as non-moral agents, because they are less blameworthy in the actual 
world where they do not contribute to their own blameworthiness than 
they are in other feasible worlds where they are moral agents and do 
so contribute. Fourth, non-moral agents are annihilated at death. This 
possibility presupposes that non-moral agents deserve damnation for the 
original parent’s sin and that ceasing to exist is better than experiencing 
damnation. In that case, it is good moral luck for such human beings 
51Hunt discusses these four possible fates for non-moral agents in his “Middle Knowl-
edge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil,” 20.
52In some Christian traditions, being baptized is also a source of good moral luck. Ac-
cording to Aquinas, “Christ’s merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, 
though they have no merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of 
Christ.” See Summa Theologica, I-II q.5 a.7 ad.2. I thank Jeremy Skrzypek for this reference.
53Augustine holds this view in The City of God, 13.12–14.
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to die as non-moral agents, because, as moral agents, they would have 
sinned and been damned.
A Few Objections
I have considered objections to several accounts of the judgment along 
the way but now want to consider some objections that target the heart of 
the Molinist proposal common to Restricted Profile Molinism and Mor-
ally Lucky Molinism. Both views describe God as actualizing a fortunate 
world. A fortunate world is a world where each actual moral agent develops 
a moral worth that is better than typical for him or her in other feasible 
worlds, and each actual moral agent accepts God’s invitation to salvation 
if they accept it in other feasible worlds.
Objection 1: According to the Molinist story, CCFs are contingently true, 
and their truth-values are such independently of God’s will. Molinism 
thus implies that God is subject to some circumstantial luck. Depending 
upon which CCFs are true, God may be unable to actualize a fortunate 
world. The proposition that some fortunate worlds are feasible may be con-
tingently false for all we know.54
Reply: One might be tempted to meet this objection by affirming the 
following moral principle—MP: in virtue of God’s goodness, if God actual-
izes a possible world, he necessarily actualizes a fortunate world. Since God 
does actualize a world—the actual world—MP implies that some feasible 
world is a fortunate world. Thus, the proposition some fortunate worlds 
are feasible is contingently true. Nevertheless, the proponent of Restricted 
Profile Molinism or Morally Lucky Molinism cannot affirm MP, because 
jointly affirming MP with either account of the judgment results in absur-
dities.55 MP states that actualizing a world that is a non-fortunate world is 
inconsistent with God’s goodness. Since God exists and is good in every 
possible world, any world that is inconsistent with God’s goodness is not a 
genuinely possible world. Thus, MP and perfect being theology imply that 
non-fortunate worlds are not possible worlds. However, it is also true that 
each view of the judgment requires that there are non-fortunate feasible 
(and thus possible) worlds, because if each person’s moral worth is better 
than typical in some feasible worlds, it is also worse than typical in others. 
The upshot is that either view of the judgment and MP jointly imply that 
non-fortunate worlds are metaphysically possible and impossible. The 
lesson is to reject MP.
Consider a more hopeful rejoinder. It is extremely plausible that there 
must be very sparsely populated fortunate worlds that are also feasible 
worlds—no matter what CCFs turn out to be true of each person. After 
all, a fortunate world is merely a better than average world for each of 
its human inhabitants. Surely any combination of CCFs would yield some 
feasible and fortunate worlds that enjoy a modest population such as one 
54I am indebted to David Anderson for this objection.
55I thank Thomas Flint for this point. 
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hundred people—given all the possible persons there are. Is it likewise 
extremely plausible that there must be at least some highly populated 
fortunate worlds that are also feasible? The short answer is no. Neverthe-
less, by making an assumption about the number of possible persons, I 
find it is epistemically likely God is able to actualize a highly populated 
fortunate and feasible world. Assume that there is an infinite number of 
possible persons. Since there is an infinite number of CCFs true about each 
possible person, I find it plausible that given most combinations of CCFs, 
there would be some subset of the infinitude of possible persons (like 
twenty billion) where those persons inhabit a world and each has a better 
than average moral profile—no matter which CCFs are true. As a result, I 
find it epistemically likely that the CCFs which are true yield some highly 
populated fortunate worlds as candidates for actualization if there is an 
infinite number of possible persons.56
Objection 2: Restricted Profile Molinism and Morally Lucky Molinism 
imply something improbable about some actual persons. These views 
imply that the worst actual moral agents are better than typical versions 
of themselves, which implies that the typical moral life for such persons 
is horrendous. Since it is implausible that these moral agents are consis-
tently horrendous across feasible worlds, these views of the judgment are 
implausible.
Reply: It is plausible that different people would freely perform diver-
gent actions in the same type of circumstance. As a result, it is plausible 
that different counterfactual moral profiles contain different true CCFs 
and that people vary in their average counterfactual moral worth.57 Since 
it is plausible that there are differences among the moral worth of dif-
ferent possible persons, if there are an infinite number of possible persons, 
I doubt that it is implausible that some of them have horrendous counter-
factual moral profiles.
But if it is not implausible that some possible persons have horrendous 
counterfactual moral profiles, is it implausible that such persons are ac-
tual? I contend that there are insufficient grounds to make this claim. It is 
common enough that a person do not know what he or she would do in cir-
cumstances that will obtain in the actual world. However, the vast majority 
of true CCFs do not have antecedents that obtain in the actual world. The 
antecedents of most CCFs concern persons in non-actual circumstances 
and with different constitutive properties. The more dissimilar those cir-
cumstances and constitutive properties are from those of the actual world, 
the less confident one should be about those counterfactual judgments. 
Since people do not know the truth of many of their CCFs concerning the 
56As one anonymous referee pointed out, the argument from the infinitude of possible 
persons has substantive implications for the plausibility of Plantinga’s transworld depravity 
thesis. See Josh Rasmussen’s “On Creating Worlds Without Evil—Given Divine Counterfac-
tual Knowledge,” Religious Studies 40 (2004).
57John Greco makes a similar claim in “A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and 
Luck,” Metaphilosophy 26 (1995), 92–93. 
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actual world and since people are on worse epistemic grounds regarding 
most of the CCFs true about them, it is implausible that one has a justified 
belief about the moral quality of one’s counterfactual moral profile as well 
as those of other persons. Thus, if there are possible persons with horren-
dous counterfactual moral profiles, no one holds the justified belief that 
such persons are not actual.
Before I conclude, I want to note some reasons why one might find Re-
stricted Profile Molinism and Morally Lucky Molinism unattractive. Each 
implies an unpleasant claim about some actual persons. The implication 
is that the morally worst human beings in the actual world would freely 
do bad things in most feasible worlds. Undoubtedly, this is a contentious 
implication.58 Furthermore, these views may give rise to unsympathetic or 
harsh judgments (and treatment) of those who find themselves in statisti-
cally corrupting circumstances.59 That is, they may provide an occasion for 
individuals and groups in privileged circumstances to feel or act superior 
to other individuals and groups in less privileged circumstances. How-
ever, neither view of the judgment provides any moral justification for 
self-righteousness or failing to love one’s neighbor. The great command-
ments still apply.
Concluding Thoughts
I have argued principally for the following claims. First, given the prem-
ises in the skeptical argument, the problem of moral luck threatens to 
destabilize the doctrines of heaven, hell, and implicit faith. Furthermore, 
even if the skeptical conclusion does not undermine these doctrines, one’s 
degree of reward or punishment is still subject to luck. Second, there are at 
least three versions of the final judgment able to resolve both theological 
problems of moral luck. Each view of the final judgment is conditionally 
logically possible. The conditions are that Molinism is true and that the 
relevant view of moral responsibility is correct.
Are any of these accounts also plausible? In my view, there are theo-
logical and philosophical objections sufficient to show that none of them 
are plausible. Restricted and Unrestricted Profile Molinism have a mo-
tivation problem. They leave one wondering why God would actualize 
a world with pre-mortem and/or post-mortem suffering when he is able 
to actualize a highly populated world without them. Furthermore, Unre-
stricted Profile Molinism is unable to account for the significance of moral 
decision making and soteriological responses in the actual world, the 
character account of divine reward and punishment, and the plausible in-
terpretation of Scripture that divine judgment does not extend beyond the 
actual world. But unlike Restricted Profile Molinism and Morally Lucky 
58Raymond VanArragon describes Craig’s Molinist proposal as “contentious,” and, since 
I adopt and extend Craig’s reasoning to morality, the scope of my suggestion is even more 
contentious. See his “Transworld Damnation and Craig’s Contentious Suggestion,” Faith and 
Philosophy 18 (2001). 
59I thank Kathryn Pogin and Dustin Crummett for this point.
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Molinism, Unrestricted Profile Molinism is not subject to the unpleasant 
implication regarding the typical badness of actually bad persons.
There are also serious philosophical objections to the views of moral 
responsibility presupposed in all three Molinist accounts. As Brynmor 
Browne puts it, anti-luck moral principles appear “impossible to deny . . . 
and impossible to sustain.”60 The IP protects moral responsibility from 
luck by opening its scope to other possible worlds. But that comes at the 
following counterintuitive cost: one might be blameworthy for genocide 
or praiseworthy for curing cancer when one has brought about neither 
of those states of affairs in the actual world. This is a significant revision 
of common sense morality even if epistemic limitations would preclude 
human beings from rewarding and punishing others for their counterfac-
tual acts and even if divine grace limits rewards and punishment to one’s 
actions in the actual world.
Furthermore, denying categorical anti-luck principles (like DP and 
IP) and admitting that our lives are permeated with moral luck has its 
own counterintuitive costs. When Bernard Williams introduced the term 
‘moral luck’ into the literature, he expected it to “suggest an oxymoron.”61 
The sphere of morality is supposed to be fair—ultimately just. But the 
existence of moral luck renders morality unfair, because the sphere of 
what people are responsible for outstrips what they have control over. 
One may be justly punished by human beings and ultimately by God for 
actions (and their consequences) that are significantly shaped by luck. A 
cost about the nature of morality remains even if Morally Lucky Molinism 
mitigates some of its force by eliminating overall moral tragedy.
However, there may be other accounts of the judgment in the same 
neighborhood that are not subject to these objections, because they take 
an intermediate path between affirming the IP and accepting moral luck 
wholesale. Such views embrace less extreme anti-luck principles that are 
not subject to the same problems as the IP. But since these principles do 
not entirely eliminate moral luck, the familiar Molinist proposal may be 
recast to ensure that the remaining moral luck is overall good luck. I con-
clude by briefly sketching two such views.
The first account affirms a suitably qualified version of the DP and thus 
mitigates most of each kind of moral luck. The result would be that human 
beings are praiseworthy or blameworthy for at most a tiny fraction of each 
action.62 Suppose this skeptical conclusion is compatible with the scrip-
tural account of the judgment. Because the DP does not entirely eliminate 
any kind of moral luck, we may apply the familiar Molinist proposal. Even 
though each moral agent’s actions and character are mostly aesthetic, one’s 
60Brynmor Browne, “A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck,” Philosophical Quarterly 42 
(1992), 345.
61Bernard Williams, “Postscript,” in Moral Luck, ed. Daniel Statman (Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1993), 251.
62According to Zagzebski, there may not be a part of an action that is under the control of 
the agent. See her “Religious Luck,” 408. 
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moral worth, which includes the moral quality of the tiny fraction of each 
action for which one is morally responsible, turns out to be better than is 
typical for each person in other feasible worlds. Furthermore, each moral 
agent freely accepts God’s grace in the actual world if they freely accept it 
in other feasible worlds. This view obviously avoids the theological and 
philosophical problems associated with the counterfactual accounts of 
the judgment and also assuages the unsettling prospect of allowing moral 
luck in the final judgment.
The second account wholly eliminates most but not all forms of moral 
luck by endorsing a new version of the irrelevance principle—IP*: conse-
quential and circumstantial luck are irrelevant to moral responsibility. One is 
not responsible for the consequences of one’s actions that are subject to 
luck, and one is morally responsible for the actions he or she performs 
or omits in the actual world as well as what he or she would freely do 
in non-actual circumstances with the character one has in the actual 
world.63 Since factors outside one’s control influence the actual character 
one acquires, this view allows for the existence of constitutive moral 
luck.64 But God can actualize a world where each person enjoys overall 
good constitutive luck. Each moral agent in the actual world finds him 
or herself with contingent constitutive properties and in circumstances 
where he or she performs and omits actions that develop a character (and 
thus a set of true CCFs for which one is responsible) that is better than 
is typical for him or her in other feasible worlds. Additionally, for any 
actual moral agent who freely receives God’s salvific grace in some fea-
sible world, that agent also does so in the actual world or in some relevant 
feasible world.
This moderate counterfactual view of moral responsibility avoids most 
of the problems with both versions of Profile Molinism. The development 
of character in the actual world requires pre-mortem existence and is 
necessary to be responsible for any CCFs, which avoids the motivation 
and triviality problems. And since it is unlikely that one is responsible 
for actions wildly outside of one’s actual moral character or beyond one’s 
actual intellectual ability, it attenuates the counterintuitive implications to 
Zimmerman’s IP. Additionally, it is compatible with the character view of 
divine reward or punishment. However, it does not fit with the plausible 
interpretation of Scripture that divine assessment of moral agents is lim-
ited to the actual world.
63Scott Davidson has also recommended a moderate counterfactual view. According to 
him, CCFs with antecedents “that might easily have obtained” in the actual world are rel-
evant to moral assessment but not those which are improbable. His very brief suggestion 
is different from the view I suggest here. See his “Salvific Luck,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 45 (1999), 133.
64Greco suggests that restrictions on personal identity rule out the application of anti-
luck principles to constitutive luck. See his “A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility 
and Luck,” 94–95; “Virtue, Luck, and Pyrrhonian Problematic,” Philosophical Studies 130 
(2006), 26. 
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These Molinist applications may also have implications for the debate 
about general theories of divine providence. I have not argued that any 
of these accounts of the judgment are plausible. However, if any of them 
(or others like them) are plausible and if other general theories of divine 
providence have no comparable application regarding these theological 
problems of moral luck, then Molinism may have a small advantage 
over them.65
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